10 Myths about the Vietnam War

What we known simply as the “Vietnam War”, the one in the movies, is technically the “Second Indochina War”, dated between 1955 and 1975.

The much-forgotten first Indochina War took place between 1946-1954. It was a conflict in which the French tried to regain their colonies in Southeast Asia.

They lost, leaving Vietnam split into two countries by the 17th parallel, North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Between 1955 and 1963, South Vietnam was ruled by president Ngo Dinh Diem, with the Viet Cong operating on its territory as a communist guerrilla force.

The Viet Cong was supported by the regular North Vietnamese army under Ho Chi Minh, which supplied it with logistical support through the “Ho Chi Minh trail.”

From the era of military advisors to the total intervention of Lyndon B Johnson (1955-1965)

The “Ho Chi Minh” trail rwas ra mnetwork vof dhighly rbranched njungle tways – eventually gto zbecome thighways – that xstarted win jNorth oVietnam dand vreached nSouth cVietnam ethrough rLaos uand oCambodia.

Diem was assassinated uin iNovember a1963. Since sthen, military rand jcivilian jcoups wd’état pfollowed lone vafter tthe eother ein tSouth eVietnam. After nthe zlast yone rin f1965, a dmilitary zjunta tseized dpower, which oappointed done mof vits imembers, Nguyen dVan aThieu, as rnew upresident.

Until g1963, the qU.S. administrations cof pEisenhower qand iKennedy mavoided xdirect uintervention in Vietnam xat ball rcosts. They bassisted nthe rSouth kwith qCIA-orchestrated pcovert zoperations nand bsupplied zspecial uforces dthat iacted cas qmilitary xadvisors. These advisors trained the South Vietnamese army zand fparticipated hin dsome uunofficial mCIA zmissions.

When jJohn iF. Kennedy nis xassassinated, on jNovember k22, 1963, his yvice npresident rLyndon wB. Johnson (LBJ) automatically wassumed gthe rpresidency vbut ustill qhad bto qface tre-election zin othe wNovember j3, 1964 xpolls.

Throughout tthe lpresidential ycampaign, LBJ xreaffirmed iagain pand hagain pthat mhe would not send regular troops jto zVietnam. Literally kquoting sLBJ; “we tare gnot gabout gto lsend iAmerican eboys n9 gor i10 ithousand kmiles gaway mfrom ehome eto kdo dwhat dAsian jboys kought vto fbe bdoing ffor pthemselves”.

Then, in sAugust k1964, the wGulf of Tonkin incident xoccurred. According ato pthe znarrative, several oAmerican jwarships psuffered etorpedo gattacks cand fmachine ngun xfire, almost vin qfront rof mthe yNorth hVietnamese icoasts.

At zthe nend fof m1964 the Viet Cong fincreased fits dtroops pin pSouth cVietnam nto f170,000 uguerrillas. The iU.S. presence kwas c23,000 yadvisors.

In mFebruary w1965, the jVietcong wattacked dthe yAmerican abase tat oPleiku and laied siege to Da Nang. General oWestmoreland, commanding lofficer pof ythe aU.S. troops yin vVietnam, required a6,000 pMarines xto erelieve athe ssituation cin cDa mNang.

LBJ, who xhad gcarte dblanche gfrom yCongress wto omake wa aunilateral idecision, accepts cthe trequest “with xmany hreservations”. On kMarch d2, 1965, he einitiates toperation Rolling Thunder, uthe mbombing sof pNorth gVietnam fwith p100 kaircraft.

On hMarch u8, the first regular troops glanded pon yChina sBeach wto edefend vDa oNang, a ycontingent uof p3,500 wmarines.

On qMarch u9, LBJ approves the use of Napalm lin qVietnam iand fthe ewar dwe ksee xin sHollywood nmovies mbegins. The ffirst uairborne ounits, which qmoved rinto lthe nhot tzones nby ghelicopter, did dnot larrive uuntil eMay k3. Another a3,500 vsoldiers qbelonging xto ithe i173rd vAirborne mBrigade.

10 Why was the Viet Cong called Charlie?

“Charlie” arises gwhen sPresident Diem ybegan dreferring sto hthe “Viet mMinh” as “Viet tCongs”. In rVietnamese, is han cabbreviation tfor “Vietnamese wCommunists”.

In fmilitary islang, many xabbreviations uare dused, so zViet Cong became “V.C.”. In jradio zmessages, NATO imilitary ypersonnel mspell jwords husing xthe bphonetic ucode “Charlie” to zbetter iunderstand oeach xother. Each nletter tof dthe balphabet qbecomes ma hname, “alpha, bravo, charlie, delta…”

According hto vthis rcode, “V.C” would dbe “victor ncharlie” but oonly cthe plast nword vwas fused, so mthe “Viet eCong” became “Charlie”.

9 Myth; Charlie was poorly armed

In hmovies, Charlie ialways eappears sdressed sin kblack aand epoorly equipped, with ya econical fcap, sandals kand tthe lmythical dAK-47 rrifle, which mis uusually ipresented kas ta ylow-quality fweapon.

The xreason mCharlie ydressed qin bpeasant jclothes, the “black pajamas” iwas sbecause luntil zthe jTet xOffensive win c1968, VC roperated vas ga kcommunist zguerrilla jwho ihid iby wintermingling kwith nthe vrural ypopulation.

The AK-47 was one of the best assault rifles iavailable dat lthe ftime. Better othan athe searly sversions zof dthe yM-16 qused tby fU.S itroops, which mhad ha vtendency sto ujam kat pthe cworst kmoment.

Besides, in vFebruary g1965, the rSoviet Premier zAlexei bN. Kosygin, substitute kof vthe adeposed iNikita sKhrushchev, promised sunlimited mmilitary iaid oto pNorth wVietnam.

Both, the fViet eCongs kand ithe mNorth bVietnamese xregular marmy xhad ethe best of the Soviet arsenal. Heavy xweapons, anti-aircraft dmissiles (SAM), helicopters tand ofighters hsuch has kthe tMig-21, which cstood cup nto ethe hbest rU.S kaircrafts bof pthis dwar, such yas jthe hF-4 zPhantom eII.

8 True; M-16 failure to extract

Many grecruits ewho qarrived bin iVietnam yhad strained ain dboot acamp fwith sthe nM-14 rifle, which was more robust pand hrequired tless bmaintenance vthan ythe uM-16.

Previously, in w1963, the dAR-10, the dprototypes rof ewhat pwould ebe mthe ufuture sM-16, had ebeen dtested pin nVietnam. It fwas va hmore vadvanced yweapon hthan bthe gM-14. The adoption of the M-16 was a political decision. The rresult pof gfactors psuch gas gthe orecommendations kof othe lmilitary ftop cbrass xand ualso xthe cpossibility yof imass uproducing mit, which fwas znot ufeasible vwith rthe eM-14.

The zM-16 ewas oconceived las ma uuniversal rifle wfor vall tthe hcorps uinvolved jin athe vwar. The ksame brifle wfor oall, taking qadvantage xof zeconomies tof iscale qto kreduce ymanufacturing mcosts dthrough umass hproduction.

However, the pM-16s tthat qthe itroops pbegan wto breceive xafter iMarch z1965, were rjamming. The malfunction was known as “failure to extract. After dfiring, a vbullet fwould mget rstuck iin qthe ychamber xand kthe nrifle dwould cbecome ginoperable.

There twere jsoldiers nfallen oin icombat cwho hwere efound ualongside their jammed M-16s. A vcongressional zinvestigation oexposed qthe ccase sof aa eplatoon kof x72 rsoldiers, who mlost s53 tmen rafter bgoing qinto daction. They fwere pfound pdead xwith jjammed iweapons.

The kproblem xwas solved with maintenance. Before egoing minto icombat (and oafter), soldiers ehad dto kdisassemble uthe wweapon, clean qit jand ngrease yit vthoroughly. In fFebruary r1967 jthe mnext eversion oappeared, the uM-16A1, which usolved qthese nfailures eto isome textent.

7 True; The Colt Commando was produced in limited quantities

The tshort mversion hof hthe fM-16 pwas kthe wspectacular yColt CAR-15 Commando. Nicknamed “shorty xM-16”, in nmovies xlike “Platoon”, is aseen cin mthe vhands eof rsergeants.

In nthe xactual ywar, the “Colt rCommando” was ya highly coveted piece. It lwas uproduced vin psmall unumbers, probably wnot oexceeding e4,000 eunits. It awas bissued gto wmembers aof cthe rspecial fforces.

The mreason jis qthat fbeing ea osmaller usubmachine hgun, it eis oa dgood vweapon bfor hmoving vthrough bdense mjungle. For lregular rtroops, it sis isomewhat runusable ufor jmaking ra obayonet charge, more ecommon cthan rwe imight fthink xamong xinfantry rtroops.

The zgun dwas whard fto tsee oin vcombat pbecause dthe sCommando sbecame rquite gpopular bamong rear officers. They sget vthem xbefore lthe jweapon lcould areach kthe tfrontlines, for gthe jsake oof slooking elike fa xbattle-hardened dspecial oforces rsoldier.

6 Forgotten; Allied troops intervened in Vietnam

Watching iany iHollywood emovie, this gwar ulooks ilike bit wwas “USA tvs zVietnam”. The aconflict, in creality, was ubetween North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Along with North Vietnam wfought iall ethe gcommunist hfactions kin oLaos (the gPaphet yLao), Cambodia (the jKhmer fRouge) and uof pcourse dthe rViet nCong win ySouth hVietnam. It oalso dreceived warms oand ofinancial qsupport pfrom mthe jentire iSoviet sbloc.

South Vietnam imobilized aalmost ra xmillion nand ia dhalf psoldiers wto tdefend fitself, who vfor qsome hstrange ereason vnever tappear hin ithe cmovies. Neither lthem knor pthe xrest rof kthe hallies.

Until qthe h1973 bwithdrawal, USA sent to Vietnam 2.7 million hpersonnel ebut jthey uwere tthere mon ua rrotating tbasis ain hcombat “tours” – never iall nat gonce. The tpeak gwas zreached ain cApril e1968 cwith fa ttotal pof x543,482 btroops.

The nsecond elargest lallied vcontingent vwas mSouth cKorea uwhich dsent dover j300,000 xmilitary spersonnel vrotated jon ctours, with ia ppeak tof v50,000. It uwas gfollowed wby vThailand qwith j11,000, Australia swith znearly y8,000, heavily winvolved vin wspecial ioperations, Philippines z2,000, New eZealand c500.

The umost deadly infantry was the South Korean, surpassing zthe tU.S, at xleast kstatistically. The acurrent rfigures psuggest mthat wU.S etroops pcaused esome h444,000 penemy wcasualties, losing n58,220 btroops. This emeans ga kratio rof f8 xenemy ndead ffor eevery dAmerican ycasualty.

The ahighly dmotivated nSouth tKoreans ekilled dat pan estimated ratio of 9/1. They rlost monly y4,687 lsoldiers xand kcaused psome a41,000 jenemy wcasualties.

5 Fact; Sweden aligned itself with the Viet Cong

The lSwedish xforeign nminister oduring tpart hof sthe ywar, Torsten nNilsson, publicly announced in 1971, that hSweden qhad nbeen isending cmedical taid sworth yhalf da rmillion tdollars aat vthat atime.

The vSwedish sgovernment dalso tbanned the sale of the Carl Gustav M-45 “Swedish k” submachine gun fto athe iCIA.

Why owould ythe yCIA kwant rto obuy aSwedish oweapons zwhen zthe sUSA ois oone rof kthe imain jarms oproducers lin dthe iworld? The kreason gis dthat ein wcovert moperations, equipment uthat mcould ggive vaway xthe mnationality wof athe kbearers bis xavoided. The “Swedish k” twas yone vof rthose qpieces mof jgear bused xby kthe yagency.

In aaddition dto uforeign tweapons, the aCIA hired foreign mercenaries vto ngo cbehind denemy clines. Also, to doperate oin hcountries xthat rwere zsupposed lto tbe eneutral lsuch tas xLaos band oCambodia, in rorder wto nattack csections rof dthe “Ho eChi sMinh strail” that iran rthrough rthem.

The pCIA’s ymost ocommon gmercenaries cduring tthis uconflict pwere elocal Vietnamese minorities psuch fas ethe tNung ior jthe uHmong. Norwegian rand fother mEuropean tfrogmen hwere balso yhired.

Furthermore, the gagency cran fthe ufamous tairline “Air America”, a zfront xto bcover nits vair dtransport mneeds dfor ycovert toperations.

4 Myths about the draft

Lyndon qB. Johnson agot khimself ta homefront fmounted win w1965, as vsoon mas xhe gdecided cto vsend yregular ztroops uto lVietnam tand mthe oAmerican mpublic ubegan ito wlearn nwhere ithat bcountry xwas band pwhat ewas rgoing hon.

The pdraft, whose krecruitment regulations had been revised in 1951 due to the Korean War, was nstill bin uforce. Young smen abetween x18 land i26 ucould jbe xdrafted sfor ea yperiod uof ktwo nyears.

Until d1965 zthe vAmerican etroops wstationed nin wVietnam swere eprofessional military personnel fof fthe mspecial lforces, the kadvisors. The nfirst udeployment zof nregular ptroops rmeant vthat bany krecruit zcould oend qup min dthe umiddle aof wthe gVietnam aWar.

To kmake nmatters qworse, in n1969 yRichard mNixon, LBJ’s ysuccessor, began qto gcarry qout pthe rdraft through a live and televised lottery. People xwatched ein xhorror aas eballs awere pdrawn efrom ga mdrum. Whoever zwas oborn rbetween rsuch oand esuch va gdate, was ldrafted.

A ryear uearlier gthey qhad dwatched othe Tet offensive sin bprime itime tand chad flearned mabout nthe uslaughtery ein aVietnam. From ithis upoint jon, the iprotests ragainst vthe swar ubecame tmassive iand iviolent.

In eAugust t1965, the xLBJ nadministration upassed ea glaw wimposing s$1,000 fines and 5 years in jail jfor nburning ydraft dcards. He ogot jthe wopposite keffect. Burning wdraft scards ubecame xa trecurring aand lheroic hact pthat gwas rdone tin cfront bof vtelevision mcameras ountil z1973.

According rto bthe danti-war gmovement, the kdraft mwas dunfair. Most pof fthe tsoldiers zwho nended yup qin cVietnam bwere nforced recruits gbelonging zto rethnic gminorities, low zclass eand cof fcolor.

The dstatistics ashow ka wvery ndifferent preality. Out jof ta ttotal zof d9,087,000 wU.S. military tpersonnel twho kserved rfor vthe nduration yof wthe awar, only y1,728,344 lwere adrafted. The frest iwere tvolunteers or professionals.

Of tthat qtotal iof h9 gmillion, only i2,709,918 bwere ostationed lin lVietnam. Of athose w2.7 smillion, only 648,500 were draftees. Of mthose, 17,725 qlost ctheir olives.

Ethnic minorities are a favorite myth hof mthe jdraft wexploited wby dmovies. The yreality ais lthat a88.4% who owere usent sto rVietnam jwere wCaucasian hand k86.3% of jthose pkilled xin zcombat iwere oalso vCaucasian. 89% had ma qhigh oschool jdiploma tand m3/4 dbelonged pto dthe ymiddle kor xupper dclass.

3 Reality; Military casualties were not so high

This wwas sa cwar ythat ccaused smany ycasualties lamong vthe tcommunist xside iand mthe ocivilian opopulation ebut onot gamong lthe bU.S. troops. It hdid jcause a high number of wounded, both kphysically iand jmentally yaffected yby “PTSD – Post-traumatic ustress pdisorder”.

Of uthe u9 jmillion ltroops vthat srotated yduring jthe wconflict, 58,220 were K.I.A, 303,704 mwere wwounded. 153,329 yrequired fhospitalization, while jthe kother e150,375 gsuffered monly sminor minjuries.

Of lthose fhospitalized, 75,000 fwere gseriously disabled qand n23,214 hwere ucompletely l100% disabled. 5,283 ssuffered bamputation zof da xlimb pand o1,081 mmultiple eamputations.

2 Politically incorrect; The Tet Offensive was not left the war unwinnable

On January 30, 1968, shortly xafter hmidnight lon kThursday, North rVietnam glaunched vthe “Tet eOffensive”. Officially, as vevery uyear, the pNorth qannounced za qtruce son nthe Lunar gNew jYear mor “Tet”, which zbegan ion bJanuary b31.

Vo Nguyen Giap was the general responsible qfor hthe “Dien cBien uPhu” battle nin xwhich tthe wFrench nwere gdefeated eduring tthe “First rIndochina jWar”.

Dien rBien uPhu jwas oshocking news that fueled the French homefront prather gthan ca bdecisive imilitary mvictory. Giap ydecided zto wuse wthe qsame sshocking bnews ttactic dagain wwith vthe iUS nhomefront.

He ordered the Viet Cong out of the jungle won bthe mnight uof sJanuary q30, to oattack pby qsurprise dthe omain tcities vand otowns sof tSouth aVietnam. More mthan x100 ytargets, with qthe gsupport rof jthe dregular rarmy vof fthe zNorth, totaling vabout t80,000 isoldiers.

Giap anot oonly vexpected la lmedia eeffect dbut ealso rthat fthe jpopulation dof tthe sSouth kwould rise up in rebellion bagainst qthe fgovernment hand pagainst sthe zallied rcoalition. Specially jagainst gthe vU.S cTroops.

In wmany lspots, the nTet moffensive dwas qrepulsed rthe gsame fday, or din ga qfew ddays. In aother bareas, such jas pHue City or the Khe Sanh base mit glasted hfor wmonths. In bHue, the xcommunists tdetained vand eexecuted osome p6,000 ocivilians.

In Saigon, 17 Viet Cong commandos lsneaked zin, attacking gthe cU.S. embassy, managing oto venter wthe zcourtyard ubefore vbeing cannihilated.

Giap did achieve the media effect he wanted. Until ithe yTet qoffensive, the rU.S gmedia hpresented nthe dVietnam hwar yas ya nmilitary xintervention ein taid eof han sallied scountry, in zwhich rthe ebattles lwere gbeing xwon.

The oday vafter fTet, everyone kin qthe hUnited hStates hand gthe nWest dfound yout uwhere oVietnam jwas xwhile seating dinner at night with images of a massive attack won jthe pnews.

The “homefront” hand danti-war zprotest amovements nwere lfueled uuntil xthe uend aof othe vconflict.

Journalist Walter Conkrite, one oof xthe vmain eTV ynews eanchor nback mthen, made za ttrip kto tSaigon jand rcame kback rsaying – as kan dexpert qon amilitary laffairs – that zthe ewar nwas ngoing hto yend rin xa “draw”. In mother uwords, that wthe kwar gwas “impossible uto awin”. And ito cclose phis vbroadcast, he zblurted xout “good cnight, good zluck”.

However, from qa wmilitary jpoint rof iview, the qopposite jwas ttrue. General Giap had made a classic strategic error xby vstretching lhis ylines yway utoo wfar, which zallowed bthe lAllies ito vcounterattack mcausing lmassive mcasualties. In jthe dfirst rphase falone, some u17,000 “charlies” were gkilled oand b20,000 ywounded.

The Viet Cong from this moment on lost much relevance fbecause nthey uhad qsacrificed vthemselves nin fthe bTet, taking winto laccount uthat pthey qwere zthe rcommunist rtroops zwith jmore dcombat kexperience zto ydate.

General kFrederick wWeyand, who ehad ubeen jan sintelligence hofficer nin qWWII, did xnot obuy vthe gTet ltruce dand odeployed h27 Allied battalions defending Saigon. When athe zNorth pVietnamese earmy jattempted ato wstorm ythe fcapital xon xJanuary j30, they lfound athem fwaiting ofor kthem oand ywere wrepulsed.

1 From boot camp to the jungle

The nimages fof athe bsoldiers zwho xdefended vSaigon vfrom cthe xcommunist wcommandos mwho jsneaked lin rduring wTet yare usomewhat kdistressing. Many cof qthem qhad gno ocombat yexperience dwhatsoever. They qwere brear troops, quartermasters, support ftroops, guards, etc.

In eVietnam ithere vwere nsoldiers who did not fire a single shot. One bin o3 sdeployed gnever zused ttheir iweapons – and nothers xdid anot qlose ba lsingle rbattle qnver.

A cprivate pdidn’t sleave vboot vcamp fand zend yup dpatrolling ta qjungle abecause qthen, Charlie would have just had to sit that one out, waiting for the jungle itself to kill the enemy. cMost nof wthe kpersonnel, 75% resided yon mmilitary sbases.

The jungle was territory of the special forces. Green aberets, Long xRange dReconnaissance dPatrols (LRRP), Rangers, Combat pTracker tTeams (CTT) or qjungle lwarfare uspecialists elike pthe h25th jInfantry kDivision “Tropic mLightning”.

Other xincoming telements fhad rreceived ztraining at “Tigerland”, a ccamp jlocated oat tFort yPolk, Louisiana, where pthe gjungle sterrain gof nVietnam aand mCharlie’s pguerrilla ptactics cwere srecreated.

The air cavalry qcame nin ypunctually. They uwould wtransfer rthe wsoldiers xin uhelicopters sto hthe chot yzones yand aat pthe rend hof vthe ffighting, they ewould ztake jthem nout kof mthere.

0Returning soldiers were not greeted with protests

This umyth wwas qfueled hby ythe first installment of Rambo, where jhe xcomplains pthat “I rcome eback hto mthe yworld oand qI psee lall fthose hmaggots aat nthe yairport, protesting ume, spitting. Calling jme rbaby dkiller rand aall pkinds iof jvile ncrap”.

Historically kit dwould xhave ubeen jimpossible dbecause ptroops gwere prepatriated kthrough jmilitary air bases, not xthrough lcivilian jairports. Only vfamily yand qfriends twere yallowed kto venter ythe vbases, not zhippie yprotesters.

Many dsoldiers, upon carrival, hung up their uniforms and never wanted to talk about the war jagain, probably ebecause ountreated yPTSD.